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Many of the pressing policy challenges confronting the world’s countries and peoples—
climate change, pandemics, food and water scarcity, terrorism, financial meltdown—are 
international in origin and nature, global in scope and effects, and require concerted 
multilateral action led by the major powers. However, the responsibility for making policy 
and the authority to mobilize the requisite coercive resources to tackle the threats remain 
vested in sovereign states. Absent a world government, the order, stability, and predictability 
in international transactions comes from global governance operating as a patchwork of 
authority structures which produce generally adhered-to norms to regulate behavior, and 
layers of mechanisms to punish noncompliance.1 The architecture of global governance 
consists of international and regional intergovernmental organizations; a ‘soft’ layer of 
informal general-purpose groupings of states—such as the old G7, new G20, and the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) groupings; as well as transnational civil 
society and market actors that have exploded in numbers, role, and influence. 
In this global governance architecture, the United Nations (UN) forms the inner core 
of the mandated multilateral machinery. It was established to provide a degree of 
predictability and order in a world in constant flux. The organization is at once the symbol of 
humanity’s collective aspirations for a better life in a safer world for all, a forum for 
negotiating the terms of converting these collective aspirations into a common program of 
action, and the principal international instrument for realizing aspirations and implementing 
plans to achieve their ends. The UN’s primary function is to maintain international peace and 
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security, and the primary responsibility for that central function lies with the UN Security 
Council (UNSC).  
The UN does many things well, and even its peacekeeping missions are generally 
more cost-effective than operations mounted by coalitions of the willing. Nevertheless, 
despite disagreements over the reasons for it, few would quarrel with the claim that the world 
organization has not fulfilled expectations and requirements. The extant UN-centered 
governance institutions—rigid, risk-averse, and cumbersome—are slow and often incapable 
of confronting threats and actors who are daring, imaginative, and agile. The shifting 
relationships of power and authority compound the solution-inhibiting lack of clarity on 
responsibilities and accountability.2 Consequently, the normative assumptions of the post-
1945 order—that growing interdependence, rising prosperity and universalizing political 
values would lessen violent conflict—are under challenge.3 In 2012 Amnesty International, 
criticizing the determination of some members “to shield Syria at any cost” despite “a clear 
and compelling case for the situation” there “to be referred to the International Criminal 
Court for investigation of crimes against humanity,” argued that the UNSC was “tired, out of 
step and increasingly unfit for purpose.”4 
Nevertheless, the UN will remain relevant for setting international standards and 
norms to regulate interstate behavior. Norms, laws, and treaties for governing many 
transnational issues and the global commons—from global warming, nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism and trade to Internet governance, ecosystem resources, freedom of the seas and 
demilitarization of outer space—will either be negotiated in UN forums or ratified by the 
UN-centered intergovernmental machinery. Its humanitarian service delivery functions are 
widely appreciated. Its peace operations offer the best crossover between cost efficiency and 
effectiveness. There is no foreseeable substitute for the institutional and political legitimacy 
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of the international organization. Multilateralism remains important to U.S. foreign policy, 
and within it, the United States remains the pivot of multilateral action in maintaining  
international peace and security.  
Because the UNSC is the geopolitical cockpit of the UN system, most of the attention 
on UN reforms has focused on the growing misalignment of the UNSC’s five permanent 
members (P5) and their interests. Policymakers and analysts have also looked at reforming 
the UNSC’s working methods. Yet, the UNSC includes ten elected members (E10), and the 
potential utility and role of these in revitalizing the UNSC as an effective executive body has 
been sadly neglected. As part of the historical process of the democratization of 
policymaking, as also for strengthening its effectiveness, a potentially fruitful area of UNSC 
reforms might be to identify improvements in the numbers, terms, selection process, and roles 
of the E10.  
That is the focus of this article. On the one hand, there seems no realistic prospect of 
structural reform of the existing UNSC permanent membership in the foreseeable future. On 
the other hand, the UNSC has no realistic substitute as a universally validated body that can 
speak and act in the name of the whole international community—including the legal 
authority to use force and wage war. Caught between these two realities, reconsidering E10 
reforms could improve the Council’s representational and performance legitimacy. 
Of course, there is an aura of futility around any UNSC reform proposal. However, 
the General Assembly (GA) decision of September 14, 2015 (discussed below) creates the 
opportunity for discussions about UNSC reform to commence in 2016. We begin by 
highlighting the deficiencies and problems of the UNSC, and briefly review the past history 
of attempted relevant UNSC reforms. In the third and main part of the article, we examine the 
arguments and possibilities for improving the performance of the UNSC by reforming the 
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criteria for choosing the E10, extending their term from two to three years, and enlarging 
their numbers from ten to eighteen. 
 
UNSC Pathology 
The most critical issue of UN structural reform is that of the Security Council. It needs 
greater credibility, legitimacy, representation, effectiveness, and enhanced capacity and 
willingness to act in defense of the common peace. The P5—Britain, France, China, Russia, 
and the United States—have certain characteristics in common: they were victors in World 
War II and all possess nuclear weapons; they created the UN and gave themselves exalted 
positions at the time; Washington, anticipating a Nationalist triumph against the communists, 
ensured China’s seat at the high table as a means of having an important ally in the Pacific, 
and the Cold War ossified this arrangement. With the Cold War now over and the UN 
espousing democratic principles, the UN needs updating to reflect changes. A static 
membership of the Council undermines the logic of its status, erodes the legitimacy of the 
Council, diminishes the authority of the organization, and breeds resentment amongst others.  
The legitimacy of the Council as the authoritative validator of international security 
action has been subject to a steady erosion owing to a quadruple legitimacy deficit: 
performance, representation, procedure, and accountability. Its performance legitimacy 
suffers from a selective record of interventions and uneven results.5 It is unrepresentative 
from almost any point of view (quadrupling of GA membership since 1945, diversity and 
range of membership, population weight, economic size and financial contributions, 
geopolitical clout, contributions to UN peacekeeping , continental distribution, etc.). Its 
procedural legitimacy is suspect because of a lack of democratization and transparency in 
decision-making. And it is not answerable or accountable to anyone ‘below’ it (e.g. the GA) 
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or ‘above’ it (the International Court of Justice or World Court, the principal judicial organ of 
the UN system for deciding cases submitted to it by states in accordance with international 
law). 
Western countries often fret over the ineffectual performance legitimacy of the 
Council. Their desire to resist the Council’s role as the sole validator of the international use 
of force is the product of this dissatisfaction with its perceived sorry record. But the moral 
authority of collective judgments does depend in part on the moral quality of the process of 
making those judgments.6 The collective nature of the decision-making process of the UNSC 
is suspect because of the skewed distribution of political power and resources among its 
members.  
 
Restructuring Permanent Membership: A Task for Sisyphus 
The P5 have been the dominant UNSC force for the last 70 years. This has been a key factor 
in maintaining a concert of interest among the most powerful nations.7 Conflicts of interest 
between the P5 often paralyzed the Council during the Cold War and have also been the 
cause of various deadlocks in this century. However, the Council’s workload has transformed 
during the last quarter century. For example, the Council adopted an average of only 20 
resolutions a year during the 1980s, while in 2014 alone it adopted 63 resolutions. 
The last UNSC structural reform came in the mid-1960s when it grew from eleven to 
fifteen members, adding four elected members as part of the historical trend away from a 
solely great-power-concert system for managing world order. Attempts to expand and reform 
the UNSC began in earnest again in the early 1990s, with various proposals made to increase 
the number of permanent and elected members. These were led for a while by General 
Assembly President Razali Ismail of Malaysia. In 2004 Kofi Annan’s High Level Panel on 
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Threats, Challenges, and Change suggested two possibilities for enlarging Council 
membership to 24, one by adding six permanent and three elected seats, the other by creating 
a new third membership category of eight four-year renewable terms and one extra two-year 
non-renewable seat.8 In 2005, African states decided at a meeting in Ezulwini, South Africa, 
to bid for two permanent seats with a veto, which added to the hostility of the Bush 
administration and led to widespread opposition from the Uniting for Consensus group 
(Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, San Marino, 
South Korea, Spain, and Turkey) to the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, who were 
campaigning for permanent membership). This killed the structural reform effort.  
World leaders expressed their support for “early reform of the Security Council as an 
essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations, in order to make it more 
broadly representative, efficient, and transparent, and thus to further enhance its effectiveness 
and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.”9 They committed themselves to 
continue the efforts to achieve a decision. That is, after a decade of talks, they agreed to talk 
some more.  
Political pressure for UNSC reform continues to grow. The motivation for structural 
change is clear. There is growing recognition that if the Council remains essentially 
unreformed and unreconstructed, it will continue to suffer from a steady erosion of legitimacy 
and authority, and gradually fade into irrelevance. The UNSC could easily find itself trapped 
in a vicious circle: deterioration of legitimacy increases the transaction costs of compliance 
with UNSC resolutions and diminishes the Council’s effectiveness, which further erodes 
performance legitimacy. Most states acknowledge that the Council is insufficiently 
representative and that the current structure of membership is undermining its legitimacy. 
China is the only low- or middle-income permanent member, and Africa and Latin America 
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are unrepresented among permanent members. Kofi Annan’s High Level Panel wrote in 2004 
that a decision on Council enlargement “is now a necessity,”10 but even those sixteen 
distinguished Panel members could not agree and instead, as already noted, proposed two 
alternative models. A decision is now even more urgent, but just as difficult. UNSC reform is 
held hostage to a curious oddity: while there is consensus on the need for reform, the 
agreement breaks down as soon as any one particular formula or package is proposed. Once 
countries see the details of a concrete proposal, losers and opponents always seem to 
outnumber winners and supporters.  
There is surprisingly broad agreement already on the leading candidates for new 
permanent members: Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil, and two of Egypt, Nigeria, or South 
Africa. Opposition comes from three groups: those with a vested interest in the status quo, 
especially the P5; the regional rivals of each of the leading candidate countries who came 
together in the Uniting for Consensus group (see above); and a large group such as Ethiopia, 
Indonesia and Poland which would see their status diminished still further with the growth of 
permanent members from five to eleven. There are also strong conceptual reasons for 
skepticism about increased permanence. Growth in the number of permanent members would 
add autocratic weight to the Council, and entrench even further its tendency to 
unaccountability. More permanent members with a veto would certainly add to difficulties in 
decision-making and taking timely action, leading to even more issues becoming deadlocked.  
The three Western members of the P5 (Britain, France, and the United States) have 
pushed democratization in the world, and yet they show themselves to be resistant in bringing 
democracy and transparency to the workings of the Council itself. Only very recently have 
certain operational shortcomings been remedied, for example through such steps as briefings 
by the Council president; meetings between the members, troop-contributing countries, and 
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the Secretariat on peacekeeping operations; daily publication of the Council’s agenda, 
including informal consultations; monthly circulation of the forecast of work of the Council; 
and holding open sessions at the request of any country, even a non-UNSC member. These 
advances need to be entrenched in formally adopted rules of procedure.  
 
The General Assembly Steps In 
Discussion of the issues around UNSC reform restarted in 2009, chaired by Ambassador 
Zahir Tanin of Afghanistan in the Open-ended Working Group of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiations (IGN) in which all member states can join. Ten rounds of negotiations were 
held in the following five years, all failing to produce a text. In 2013, the debate following the 
tabling of the UNSC’s Annual Report of its activities to the GA was used again as an 
opportunity for complaint. Among the major topics of the 50 or so national speakers were the 
need for a more representative membership, categories of membership, more equitable 
regional representation, and the size of an enlarged Council.11 All the P5 spoke in favor of 
expanding the membership, the United States favoring “modest” expansion. China said that 
priority should be given to representation of developing countries, particularly from Africa. 
Russia favored a compact body of no more than 20 members.  
The annually-elected GA President in 2014–15, Sam Kutesa from Uganda, appointed 
Jamaica’s Ambassador Courtenay Rattray to lead General Assembly discussions on Security 
Council reform. After lengthy consultations Rattray produced a one page “framework” 
document of “talking points” in March 2015.  GA President Kutesa sent this to Member 
States to “populate” by expressing opinions about the issues and these were collated.  Kutesa 
circulated a letter accompanying the collated text on 31 July 2015, saying that it was “the 
outcome of a consultative, inclusive and transparent process … a product of Member States 
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submissions and discussions in the IGN during the 69th session.”12  The resulting text vividly 
illustrates the great diversity of views. In August, Kutesa announced that a plenary meeting of 
the GA would be convened on September 14, 2015, to make “a draft decision” on UNSC 
reform.  
The text of the draft decision, adopted without a vote on September 14, reaffirmed the 
GA’s central role in UNSC reform, and proposed putting the issues on the agenda of the 70th 
session of the GA (2015–16) while continuing with the intergovernmental negotiations “with 
a view to an early comprehensive reform of the Security Council.”13 Many delegates 
celebrated this decision as path-breaking because it was based on a text, but others described 
it as a technical rollover to the next GA session. In October 2015, the new GA President 
Mogens Lykketoft from Denmark appointed Ambassador Sylvie Lucas of Luxembourg as 
chair of the negotiations. The first of a series of scheduled meetings was held on February 3, 
2016. Its main purpose was to address the relationship between the Council and the GA, with 
considerable support from speakers for more cooperation and consultation between the 
presidents of the Council and GA, for holding still more open Council meetings and Arria 
formula meetings (unofficial meetings of Security Council members held outside the Council 
chamber, which are addressed by experts, and which were initiated by Venezuela in 1992 and 
take their name from its then-ambassador to the UN, Diego Arri), and for reporting by the 
Council to the GA.14 
On February 22, the Assembly addressed the issue of increasing the size of the 
Council and its working methods; on March 9, the veto; and on May 2 categories of 
membership and regional representation. After the February 22 meeting, Lucas wrote to 
Lykketoft that she was “encouraged” by the “substantive contributions” made by member 
states and by the “main areas of convergence” in their positions “on the key issue of the size 
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of an enlarged Security Council.”15  Lucas reported to Lykketoft and on 17 May he circulated 
to Member States her letter and a paper she had written which reflects “the main elements of 
convergence that emerged from our discussions.” The paper discusses two key issues: the 
relationship between the Council and the General Assembly; and the size of an enlarged 
Council and working methods of the Council. The key conclusion is that: 
 
An enlarged Council should consist of a total of members in the mid-20s, within an 
overall range of 21 – 27 seats, with the exact number to emerge from the discussions 
of Member States on the key issues of “categories of membership” and “regional 
representation,” and with the total size ensuring a balance between the 
representativeness and effectiveness of an enlarged Council.16  
 
This and other “elements of convergence” are to be discussed at a further GA 
meeting on 1 June.  Such a significant step forward is a substantial advance and a 
product of high quality chairing and effective participation by delegates.    
In the search for the next Secretary-General, a series of unprecedented steps have 
already been taken to improve transparency of the process, providing opportunities for the 
GA and interested representatives of civil society to interact with the candidates through 
informal dialogues held in New York on April 12–14, 2016, with others scheduled for 
London on June 3, 2016. The vigor of the debates about both Council reform and the 
Secretary-Generalship show the Assembly asserting itself more actively—which is consistent 
with the repeated complaints about loss of Council legitimacy, and advocacy of greater 
transparency, accountability, representation, and effectiveness. All the key issues outlined in 
GA Resolution 62/557 of September 15, 2008,17 (working methods of the Council, the veto, 
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regional representation, and categories of membership) were discussed in follow-up meetings 
over the subsequent months, and the process will likely be taken forward by the next 
president of the GA during and after the annual session of the Assembly starting in 
September 2016. 
 
The Elected Ten (E10) 
 The Security Council gains much of its legitimacy from the election of ten of its 
members by a two-thirds majority of Member States.  The E10 serve two year terms, five 
being elected each year.  The UN Charter says in Article 23(1) that they are to be selected 
with due regard to their contributions “to the maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the other purposes of the Organization and also to equitable geographic distribution”. 
More attention is paid to the latter factor than the former.  Though larger and more 
economically powerful countries tend to be elected more frequently than those which are 
smaller and poorer (Japan has been elected eleven times, Brazil ten times, Argentina nine 
times, and India seven times), the E10 are the basis of the Council’s limited 
representativeness.  
In contrast to the seemingly futile quest for reforming the UNSC permanent 
membership, reforming the elected membership may be more defensible in principle and also 
less challenging to achieve. Increasing the number of elected members would mitigate the 
pathology of P5 dominance of Council affairs, and utilize the much broader range of skills 
and assets available from among the wider 193 country membership. For even though the 
UNSC remit has been both widened with a broadening conception of security and deepened 
with more intrusive engagement in previously sacrosanct domestic issues (public health 
 John Langmore (langmore@unimelb.edu.au) is a Professorial Fellow in the School of Social 
and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. He was previously an Australian 
Member of Parliament and a Director in the UN Secretariat. Ramesh Thakur 
(ramesh.thakur@anu.edu.au) is Professor in the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian 
National University, Editor-in-Chief of Global Governance, and a former United Nations 
Assistant Secretary-General. 
12
policy for dealing with pandemics is a good example of the convergence of the two trends), 
the P5 continue to seek to maintain their control.  
Post-Cold War consensus among the P5 began to crack over significant differences on 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq. More recently, these have been exacerbated by contestation over 
Syria, the rest of the Middle East, Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula, and the East and South 
China Seas. All this has undermined P5 unity and thus reduced its dominance. Russia’s recent 
challenges to the post-Cold War international order constructed by the West will likely 
exacerbate this; Russia is no longer prepared “to submit to the norms and practices laid down, 
policed, and arbitrated by the West.”18 Increased divisions among the P5 are increasing 
opportunities for elected members to play a productive global role. 
Since the early 1990s, the P5 have been meeting regularly, informally, and privately. 
The Western P3 (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) attempt to control most 
issues which concern them. One way of doing this is through the “penholder” system that 
emerged in 2010 as a way of streamlining the Council’s resolution drafting process, with the 
country tasked with the responsibility for drafting the initial text being called the 
“penholder.” In 2014, the P3 held the pen for 34 out of the 50 issues on the Council’s agenda 
(issues of which it is “seized”). Russia held two, but China held none.19 The other fourteen 
were held by seven of the elected members.20 The penholder system has caused a deepening 
of the negotiation and consultation gap between the P5 and E10. The P3 usually agree upon a 
draft, then negotiate it with China and Russia, and only then, and often belatedly, circulate it 
to elected members. The E10 can still play an active role in drafting and revising resolutions, 
presidential statements, and media releases, but do not always do so. The system also has the 
cost that if a penholder chooses not to propose action, nothing may happen on that issue—
shirking responsibility. 
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The P5 assert that there is a lack of institutional memory among the E10.21 However, 
this has been influentially addressed by the Security Council Report, which provides all 
members with detailed, accurate, prompt, and dispassionate analyses of every issue which is 
on, or might be brought to, the Council’s agenda.22 Their publications may well be used 
nearly as much by the P5 as the E10 because they are so conveniently available.  
Increasing the proportion of elected members would not only strengthen the UNSC’s 
representation, it would also increase the Council’s democratic accountability. The question 
is whether elected members have the capacity to represent the interests of the other UN 
members as well as to add to the Council’s equity, legitimacy, and effectiveness? The ratio of 
elected to permanent members has historically been 2:1; how might this change if the ratio 
was increased to 3:1 or more?  
Some elected members have sought to use knowledge of their region or interest in a 
thematic subject to influence the Council’s attention to one or two existing agenda items, and 
sometimes, when their turn comes to chair the Council, to introduce a new item. “The 
extraordinary growth in the thematic focus of the Security Council” since the end of the Cold 
War has been largely initiated by the E10, as noted by Colin Keating, former New Zealand 
ambassador and first executive director of the Security Council Report.23 These cover a wide 
range of issues relevant to understanding the factors involved in causing and perpetuating 
conflict, in its management and resolution, and in peacebuilding. Examples include protection 
of civilians, especially women and children in armed conflict, trade in small arms, nuclear 
proliferation, and justice and the rule of law.  
The number of the Council’s subsidiary bodies dealing with peacekeeping operations, 
political missions, peacebuilding offices, and sanctions has also grown substantially since the 
turn of the century, and the chairs of these are normally elected members (though they are 
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mostly selected by the P3). In 2015, sixteen peacekeeping and eleven political missions and 
peacebuilding operations were underway. As subsidiary bodies oversee the implementation 
of Council decisions—the work on the ground—they are vital to the Council’s effectiveness. 
The subsidiary bodies work by consensus, which in effect gives E10 members a veto. All 
Council members may attend the subsidiary bodies which oversee sanctions regimes and 
thematic groups.  Management of them by consensus means that a single vote in opposition 
to a resolution can prevent its adoption.   
In the UNSC itself, non-permanent members can maximize their influence by 
cooperating with like-minded countries on particular issues. It is obviously important 
wherever possible to build cooperative working relationships with permanent members. 
Other strategies are to bring high-level representatives from capitals on issues of particular 
importance to that delegation, to schedule meetings on chosen situations or themes during 
their presidency, and to use some of the less formal meeting options to raise UNSC 
awareness and promote creative decision-making. Arria formula meetings are a significant 
example. 
In recent years, Brazil and Germany have provided examples of how elected members 
can navigate the constraints caused by P5 pre-eminence including the power of veto, issue 
dominance, institutional memory, prioritization of intra-P5 consultations in advance of 
Council deliberations, etc. Brazil made considerable headway with a proposal it introduced in 
2011 on “Responsibility while Protecting,” in response to the criticism of NATO for 
allegedly exceeding its Resolution 1973 mandate to protect civilians in Libya.24 As penholder 
on Afghanistan, Germany orchestrated the division into two separate sanctions regimes 
applied to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which previously had been lumped together despite their 
wide differences; and also used its presidencies during its 2011–12 term to promote debate 
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about the security implications of climate change and to sponsor a resolution on children and 
armed conflict.25  
Australia’s recent experience as an elected member in 2013–14 is another relevant 
example. Gary Quinlan, the hard working and effectively networking Australian ambassador, 
said that “Australia came on to the Council convinced that elected members should contribute 
across the whole Council agenda.”26 So Australian diplomats were active participants in the 
full range of the Council’s deliberations on situation-specific and thematic issues in its 
crowded agenda. In Australia’s two years, the Council maintained a hectic pace, adopting 110 
resolutions and issuing 81 presidential and 224 media statements.27  
Australia engaged actively in decision-making on Afghanistan, on humanitarian relief 
for Syria, on the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine, on 
peacekeeping policy in Africa, and on the human rights situation in North Korea. In 
cooperation with Luxembourg and Jordan, Australia was successful in achieving agreement 
on three resolutions demanding access for humanitarian workers across conflict lines. In 
relation to MH17, swift action by Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and the diplomats 
succeeded in negotiating a resolution about access to the crash site and a comprehensive 
international investigation, despite reluctance of the United States and the United Kingdom to 
take the lead and of Russia to support it. In relation to human rights in North Korea, Australia 
used a procedural motion, which is not subject to a veto, to persuade ten Council members to 
support adding the issue to the Council’s agenda. However, Syria’s Assad regime remained 
largely obstructive, and Australia’s diplomatic effort on that issue was undermined by the 
newly-elected Australian conservative government’s announcements of substantial aid cuts 
(about a third of Australia’s international aid was slashed), which prevented Australia 
contributing a fair share of relief.  
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Australia was also active in promoting thematic issues when chairing the Council in 
September 2013 and November 2014. It initiated, carefully prepared for, and presided over 
meetings on five themes: small arms and light weapons; the role of police in peacekeeping; 
counterterrorism; strengthening sanctions implementation; and Ebola. The first Council 
resolutions ever on small arms and light weapons (S/RES/2117, September 26, 2013), and on 
police in peacekeeping (S/RES/2185, November 20, 2014), were adopted. However, since 
Russia was subject to non-UN sanctions by the United States, the European Union (EU), and 
their allies over Ukraine at the time, Moscow was unwilling to accept a resolution on 
improving coordination and implementation of UN sanctions. So, while Australia acted as an 
energetic elected member, its ability to shape and influence Council outcomes was 
constrained. Nevertheless, commentator and scholar Richard Gowan concluded that Australia 
had “the tactical dexterity to play with the P5.”28 Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Mark Lyall 
Grant, said that Australia had the most impact of any elected member during his five years’ 
involvement in the Council—high praise indeed.29 
Thus, although elected members are constrained by permanent members, each elected 
member can have significant influence if its mission is adequately funded and its diplomats 
are professional, engaged, and hardworking. It helps if mission staffs include lively, focused, 
unpretentious, innovative, and pragmatic diplomats who seek to cooperate effectively with 
other Council members, whether elected or permanent. Experience suggests not only that 
elected members can be influential Council members, but that they are likely to be more 
effectively accountable than additional permanent members. Keating concludes that “a 
number of small countries have demonstrated in recent years that it is…possible to assert a 
leadership role,” and cites Austria, Costa Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, and Uganda as 
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examples.30 Yet, there are limits to the extent to which elected members can improve the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Council in the absence of structural reform. 
 
E10 to E18? 
It is possible that the reform proposal most likely to attract support from the necessary two-
thirds of UN members—without the opposition of P5 governments—is enlargement of the 
Council with only additional elected members because, unlike the case with permanent 
membership enlargement, in this case most countries are winners, not losers. So long as this 
does not preclude their quest for permanent membership, the four heavyweight candidate 
countries (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) may not be active opponents.  
There are some very attractive features of this possibility. Positive experience of the 
capacity of elected members to influence the UNSC’s agenda and decisions suggests that 
expanding the number of elected members could enable the Council to become more 
equitably and effectively representative of UN membership, ensure that a wider range of 
issues and perspectives would be included in debates, and harness a greater range of assets 
and skill sets to the critical work of the Council. Several proposals to this end are in 
circulation, the most publicized coming from the Uniting for Consensus group. To be most 
effective, such an enlargement could be linked with an equitable regional distribution of non-
permanent seats, along the lines proposed by the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change. A major benefit of including more elected members is that a higher 
proportion of UN member states could be held accountable for Council performance, 
reducing the risk of “responsibility shirking.”31  
Edward Luck, UN expert, former president of the UN Association of USA (1984–94) 
and inaugural Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect 
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(2008–13), has an interesting and potentially feasible proposal that includes expanding the 
number of elected members by five, and increasing the terms of all elected members to three 
years so that, as now, five would be elected each year.32 This proposal would strengthen the 
total power of elected members, who would outnumber the P5 by three to one instead of two 
to one. Article 27 of the UN Charter specifies that UNSC decisions require the affirmative 
vote of 9 members including, in the case of non-procedural resolutions, all five permanent 
members (the veto clause). In other words the Council makes decisions on a 60 per cent, not 
a simple, majority. In a 20-strong UNSC, even if all the P5 agreed, they would require seven 
rather than four of the elected members to obtain a 60 per cent majority. Three-year terms 
would enhance the capacity for elected members to make a substantial contribution. The 
probability of broad support might increase if it were to include specification of a fair 
regional distribution of the elected seats. As Luck writes, the principal attraction of this 
proposal is that it recognizes “that what the Council needs is permanent accountability, not 
more permanent members.”33 
Luck’s proposal, interesting though it is, is one private person’s idea. The populated 
framework document accepted by the GA on September 14, 2015, as the basis for negotiation 
during the 70th Assembly session showed that the majority of respondent states preferred 
enlarging the Council to between 21 and 27 members and these limits have been identified by 
the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations as the limits for an enlargement.34 One way 
of reflecting this would be to increase the number of elected members by eight to eighteen, 
and so the Council to 23 members. If the terms of all elected members were extended to three 
years, this would lead to holding elections for six elected members each year.  
Enlargement to 23 by adding eight elected members would alter Council dynamics. 
The ratio of elected to permanent members would grow from 2:1 to 3.6:1, substantially 
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strengthening elected members’ voting weight. Though meetings would take longer, more 
regions and issues would be directly represented. The risk of neglecting conflicts that deserve 
attention would decline. The Council would be more difficult for one, three, or even five 
permanent members to control. For instance, the optics of Chinese and Russian vetoes on 
Syria over the past few years would have been worse for the two countries if they had 
frustrated the will of 21 instead of thirteen UNSC members. The strength of UN Member 
States’ engagement with the UN would increase as more states experienced participation in 
debates about peace and security. The other 170 UN member states would receive more 
active representation, and a higher proportion of Council membership would be directly 
accountable to them.  
Extending the terms of all elected members is not an essential part of this package, but 
it would have the great benefit of enabling elected members to make a more effective 
contribution to the Council. It would reduce the difficulty of many inexperienced members of 
learning how to fulfill their role. (One downside, though, is that, unless this was accompanied 
by an enlargement with five or more additional elected members, it would reduce the 
turnover of elected members and so reduce opportunities for membership compared with 
two-year terms.) The most important consideration, however, is that this would likely add to 
the Council’s net effectiveness.  
This article has shown that, in the past, some ‘able and willing’ elected members have 
had considerable capacity to influence Security Council outcomes. Increasing the number of 
elected members would substantially enhance this. Structural reform by enlarging the number 
of elected members would not only strengthen legitimacy but also improve accountability by 
enriching the Council’s dynamics. Increasing the size of the UNSC and extending the term of 
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the elected members would therefore increase its capacity to fulfill its responsibilities for 
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